Papers by Aleksandra Korolova

RAPPOR: Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response

Lots of software developers would love to know in detail how people use their work, and to that end, there’s an increasing number of programs that phone home with crash reports, heat maps of which UI elements get used, and even detailed logs of every interaction. The problem, of course, is how to collect as much useful information as possible without infringing on user privacy. Usually, what the developers want are aggregate statistics—how often does this widget get used by everyone, that sort of thing—so the logical method to apply is differential privacy. However, stock differential privacy algorithms assume a central, trusted database, and in this case, the only people who could run the database are the developers—the very same people against whom individual responses should be protected. Also, differential privacy’s mathematical guarantees are eroded if you repeatedly ask the same survey questions of the same population—which is exactly what you want to do to understand how user behavior changes over time.

This paper solves both problems with a combination of randomized response and Bloom filters. Randomized response is an old, ingenious idea for asking sensitive yes-no survey questions such that any one person has plausible deniability, but the true aggregate number of yes responses is still known: each survey participant secretly flips a coin before answering, and if it comes up heads they answer yes whether or not that’s true. Otherwise they answer honestly. After the fact, everyone can claim to have answered yes because of the coin flip, but to recover the true population statistic one simply doubles the number of no answers. Bloom filters (which I’m not going to try to explain) are used to extend this from yes-no to reporting sets of strings. Finally, there are two stages of randomization. Given a set of survey questions, the system computes a Permanent randomized response which is, as the name implies, reused until either the answers or the questions change. This prevents privacy erosion, because each user is always either answering honestly or falsely to any given question; a nosy server cannot average out the coin tosses. Additional instantaneous randomness is added each time a report is submitted, to prevent the report being a fingerprint for that user. The system is said to be in use for telemetry from the Chrome browser, and they give several examples of data collected in practice.

The Permanent randomized responses illustrate a basic tension in security design: you can often get better security outcomes versus a remote attacker if you keep local state, but that local state is probably high-value information for a local attacker. For example, any system involving trust on first use will store a list of frequently contacted remote peers, with credentials, on the local machine; tampering with that can destroy the system’s security guarantees, and simply reading it tells you, at a minimum, which remote peers you regularly connect to. The TAILS live-CD is intended to leave no trace on the system it’s run on, which means it changes its entry guards on every reboot, increasing the chance of picking a malicious guard. In this case, a local adversary who can read a Chrome browser profile has access to much higher-value data than the Permanent responses, but a cautious user who erases their browser profile on every shutdown, to protect against that local adversary, is harming their own security against the Chrome developers. (This might be the right tradeoff, of course.)

I also wonder what a network eavesdropper learns from the telemetry reports. Presumably they are conveyed over a secure channel, but at a minimum, that still reveals that the client software is installed, and the size of the upload might reveal things. A crash report, for instance, is probably much bulkier than a statistics ping, and is likely to be submitted immediately rather than on a schedule.