At this year’s LangSec Workshop, a paper on formal analysis of cases where compiled-code optimizations can introduce security holes that weren’t present in the source code. This class of problems has been a concern for some time; for a general overview, see this series of posts on John Regehr’s blog:   . I’ll give one concrete example, which happens to be the running example in the paper.
void crypt (...)
key = load_secret_key();
...; // work with the secure key
key = 0x0; // scrub memory
No correct C program can observe values in local variables after a function returns, so the compiler is very likely to delete the final store to
key as unnecessary (
dead in compiler jargon). However, the programmer’s intent was to ensure that the secret value in
key does not survive in memory after
crypt returns, where it might be accessible to malicious code—the adversary is not bound by the definition of
correct C program. By removing the
dead store, the compiler introduces a security hole.
This paper proposes a general strategy for analyzing compiler optimizations to determine whether or not they can introduce security holes. They observe that the definition of
correct C program is in terms of an
abstract machine that ignores or leaves undefined many low-level nuances. Continuing with the above example, the C standard says only that if code executing in the same program attempts to access the memory allocated to
the behavior is undefined—anything at all can happen. In particular, reading from that memory might legitimately return either zero or the secret key … or some other value altogether, or it might crash the program. And the standard takes no notice at all of the possibility that another program (such as a debugger, or malware) might gain access to this program’s memory.
The real computer on which the program is executing, by contrast, exhibits some concrete and (usually) deterministic behavior for any arbitrary sequence of machine operations. Even when the architecture specification leaves an outcome undefined, some concrete thing will happen on a physical CPU and it will usually be the same concrete thing for all instances of that model of CPU. This paper’s proposal is simply that compiler optimizations have the potential to introduce security holes whenever they change the observable behavior of the physical machine. Therefore, a correctness proof for an optimization can be converted into a
does not introduce security holes proof by changing its model from the abstract machine to a physical machine. In the
crypt example, deleting the final store to
key is invisible in the abstract machine, and therefore a valid optimization of the original code. But in the physical machine, it means the previous, secret value persists on the stack (a concept which doesn’t even exist in the C abstract machine) and may be retrievable later. If the stack is included in the machine model, the original correctness proof for dead-store elimination will detect the information leak.
Dead-store elimination is well understood as a source of this kind of problem, and library-level band-aids exist. I suspect the greatest value of this technique will be in identifying other optimizations that can potentially introduce information leaks. There is some discussion of this in the paper (common subexpression elimination as a source of timing-channel vulnerabilities) but they do not take it all the way to a model. It would be interesting to know, for instance, whether the scary-sophisticated algebraic loop-nest transformations that you might want applied to your cryptographic primitives can introduce data-dependent timing variation that wasn’t present in the source code.
Sadly, this technique by itself is not enough to prevent compiler-introduced vulnerabilities; a dead-store elimination pass that was valid in the physical machine for all memory writes would wind up doing almost nothing, which is not what we want. (The authors acknowledge this, implicitly, when they talk about the undesirability of turning all optimizations off.) To some extent, tightening up the language specification—making the abstract machine exhibit less undefined behavior—can help, by making the effects of optimization more predictable. John Regehr has a proposal for
int *alloc(int nrelems)
int size = nrelems * sizeof(int); // may overflow
if (size < nrelems) abort(); // attempt to check for overflow
According to the rules of the C abstract machine, signed integer overflow causes undefined behavior, which means the compiler is entitled to assume that the comparison
size < nrelems is always false. Unfortunately, making signed integer overflow well-defined does not render this code safe, because the check itself is inadequate: fixed-width twos-complement wraparound multiplication (which is the behavior of the integer multiply instruction on most CPUs) can produce values that are larger than either multiplicand but smaller than the mathematically correct result, even when one multiplicand is a small number. (In this example, with the usual
sizeof(int) == 4, passing 1,431,655,766 for
nrelems would produce 1,431,655,768 for
size when it should be 5,726,623,064.) For the same reason, making all the variables unsigned does not help.
On a higher level, compiler authors will fight tooth and nail for aggressive optimization, because compiler authors (kinda by definition) like writing optimizations, but also because they’ve got to satisfy three conflicting user groups at once, and the latter two are more numerous and have deeper pockets:
Systems programmers, who want their C to be translated directly and transparently to machine language, and believe that
undefined behaviorexists to allow variation in CPU behavior but not compiler behavior.
Applications programmers, who want the compiler to crush as many abstraction penalties as possible out of their gigantic white-elephant C++ codebases which there will never be time or budget to clean up.
Number crunchers, who care about four things: speed, speed, not having to code in FORTRAN or assembly language anymore, and speed.
And what makes this extra fun is that cryptographers are simultaneously in group 1 and group 3. I’m not going to make ETAPS 2015, but I am very curious to know what DJB is going to say about